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Abstract
This paper introduces PriMaL, a general PRIvacy-preserving MAchine-Learning
method for reducing the privacy cost of information transmitted through a net-
work. Distributed sensor networks are often used for automated classification and
detection of abnormal events in high-stakes situations, e.g. fire in buildings, earth-
quakes, or crowd disasters. Such networks might transmit privacy-sensitive infor-
mation, e.g. GPS location of smartphones, which might be disclosed if the network
is compromised. Privacy concerns might slow down the adoption of the technol-
ogy, in particular in the scenario of social sensing where participation is voluntary,
thus solutions are needed which improve privacy without compromising on the event
detection accuracy.
PriMaL is implemented as a machine-learning layer that works on top of an
existing event detection algorithm. Experiments are run in a general simulation
framework, for several network topologies and parameter values. The privacy foot-
print of state-of-the-art event detection algorithms is compared within the proposed
framework. Results show that PriMaL is able to reduce the privacy cost of a dis-
tributed event detection algorithm below that of the corresponding centralized al-
gorithm, within the bounds of some assumptions about the protocol. Moreover the
performance of the distributed algorithm is not statistically worse than that of the
centralized algorithm.
Keywords: privacy, machine learning, distributed sensor networks, event detection
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: sbennati@ethz.ch (Stefano Bennati), C.M.Jonker@tudelft.nl (Catholijn
M. Jonker)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 8, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
07
15
0v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  2
1 M
ar 
20
17
1. Introduction
Distributed sensor networks are applied to an ever-growing set of real-world do-
mains [RSCB13], which is bound to grow even more with the further diffusion of
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies [WADX15, LDXZ15]. Sensor measurements in
these networks are analyzed by an event detection algorithm and reported to some
authority, referred to as supervisor. Generally, a larger quantity of data obtained by
the detection algorithm translates to a higher event detection accuracy. The data
measured by the sensors is often privacy-sensitive, particularly in the case of social
sensing [MBG+15, PNV+16] where sensors are related to specific people, and where
this data can be used to infer user habits and preferences [dMHVB13]. The supervi-
sor is modeled as a honest-but-curious adversary [Gol05], i.e. it performs the event
detection accurately, but it can additionally run any type of algorithm on the data it
receives, thus the more measurements are received the higher the potential privacy
loss.
The tradeoff between privacy and accuracy is crucial in social sensing scenarios
as participation in social sensing is usually voluntary, thus users could be motivated
to leave the network if they perceive a high privacy cost.
Case study: Detection of fires in households
Consider a scenario in which each house is equipped with an infrared camera. These
cameras can easily detect the start of a fire, but there are also many other events
that might trigger a false alarm, for example an open oven. The more contextual
information is contained in the alarm, the more privacy sensitive information can
be inferred by a honest-but-curious supervisor. For example transmitting the light
intensity or the infrared image of each room might help finding more accurately the
source of fire, but might also reveal privacy sensitive information about the tenants.
Case study: Earthquake detection through smartphones
Consider a scenario in which an authority wants to promptly detect earthquakes in
urban areas. In order to do so, the authority asks the population to collaborate
by sharing the measurements of their smartphone’s movement sensors [MBG+15].
Smartphones as an ensemble have the features of being broadly diffused, virtually
covering all the territory, and being more concentrated in populated areas, where an
earthquake can deal the most damage. For the same reasons this solution has the
disadvantage of being potentially very privacy-intruding, as every device is associ-
ated with a person thus it can be misused to infer the habits of the owner. When
dealing with a honest-but-curious supervisor, the mechanism has to ensure that re-
ports cannot be linked back to a specific device. Contextual information can help
improving the accuracy but makes it easier for a malicious aggregator to link a series
of reports to the same device [MYYR13], thus it should be minimized.
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Solutions are needed to increase user privacy without reducing detection accu-
racy. Several privacy-enhancing techniques are proposed in the literature, for exam-
ple anonymization techniques which prevent tracking users over time by breaking the
connection between data and user identity, e.g. Mix-Zones [BS04]. A limitation of
this solution is the need of a trusted middleware system that performs the anonymiza-
tion. In the scenario where third-party services cannot be trusted, users have to
implement privacy-preserving techniques autonomously, from the bottom-up. One
such technique is obfuscation [DK05], which degrades the quality of privacy-sensitive
data, e.g. location, such that the exact value cannot be univocally determined. Ob-
fuscation has the disadvantage of introducing uncertainty in the measurement, which
cannot always be tolerated, e.g. fire detection.
The goal of this paper is to develop a bottom-up method for reducing the privacy
cost of communication in distributed sensor networks. The increased sophistica-
tion and computational capabilities of IoT devices allows for equipping them with
intelligent algorithms, which can be used to optimize individual properties of the
devices. Software optimization is preferable over ad-hoc design as the devices can
be reprogrammed for different networks and protocols, as well as adapt to individual
circumstances e.g. preferences of the owner. Event detection algorithms in the liter-
ature use different flavors of machine learning to improve the detection accuracy, but
to the best of our knowledge machine learning has not been applied yet to increasing
privacy. It is assumed that each information transmitted over the network is asso-
ciated to a privacy cost, so privacy can be increased by optimizing the contents of
communication.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (I) Definition
of a protocol and an algorithm for privacy-preserving event detection, which can
be implemented on top of any existing detection algorithm. (II) Definition of the
criteria for a generally-applicable event detection algorithm. (III) Implementation of
PriMaL in a general framework and analysis of its performance and privacy footprint
for several network topologies. (IV) Application of PriMaL on several state-of-the-
art detection algorithms, and comparison of its privacy footprint. (V) Discussion
of the effect of several parameter values on the privacy and accuracy of the event
detection mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a description of
state-of-the-art event detection algorithms, and of criteria for the general applicabil-
ity of an event detection algorithm. Section 3 describes the setting formally. Section
4 describes in detail the methodology and the concepts behind it. Section 5 presents
the results of the simulations and discuss their implication. Section 6 analyzes and
compares the privacy footprint of several state-of-the-art algorithms. Section 7 con-
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cludes with a discussion of the findings and indications for future developments.
2. Background Literature
Three types of actors are common in the literature: sensors, agents and super-
visors. Sensors are hardware devices that perceive the environment and output a
measurement at regular intervals. It is assumed that their specifications are given
and their behavior is fixed. Agents are entities equipped with some machine-learning
algorithm, e.g. a classifier. They cannot measure directly but have the ability to
process and classify measurements. It is assumed that they can run arbitrary algo-
rithms. Supervisors are physical or virtual entities that are connected to every agent
and log alarms reported by them. Supervisors can additionally provide agents with
feedback about the classification accuracy, or perform some operation on the alarms,
typically computing the consensus between individuals [BMHH09, BMP+10]. The
goal of the network is to classify events accurately and inform the supervisor about
this classification.
Sensor measurements are commonly assumed to be correlated in space or time
[ZMH09, FLK13, RM08, BMHH09, BMP+10, ZHM+12]. This work assumes in-
stead that agents which process the same event type can communicate with each
other. Each agent is equipped with a classifier, trained on the local measurements
[FOC+11, ZMH09, RM08, BMP+10]. This has the advantage over solutions with a
single classifier or global threshold (e.g. [FLK13, BMHH09]) that the system can
capture local differences in the sensor readings, e.g. environmental conditions. The
disadvantage of this approach is that accuracy is lower because of the reduced size
of training data for each sensor [WDWS10].
Network organizations commonly found in the literature can be classified in cen-
tralized, decentralized and distributed. In a centralized organization a single agent
is in charge of the whole sensor network: it receives the information from all sensors
and decides individually whether to send an alarm. The communication footprint
of a centralized system is constant and proportional to the number of sensors. Re-
ceiving all information in the network allows the agent to take optimal decisions,
but the agent becomes a single points of failure that undermines the robustness and
reliability of the system. In a decentralized system, each sensor is equipped with a
local algorithm that decides whether to send an alarm based on local experience.
A decentralized system transmits less measurements when compared to a central-
ized organization, as decisions are taken locally so the majority of measurements are
not transmitted over the network. As opposed to a centralized organization, this
configuration does not have any single points of failure, so it is more resilient to
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malfunctioning and failure. The disadvantage is that each agent acts independently
of the others, so a voting algorithm is often required to aggregate the individual
decisions and come to a consensus. A distributed system is similar to a decentralized
system, with the difference that sensors can communicate with each other in order to
share experience [ZMH09], or to take collective decisions [RM08, BMP+10]. In this
setting communication footprint is high and it is proportional to the connectivity
between agents.
Communication is limited to the 1-hop neighborhood of agents, to avoid rout-
ing issues and reduce power consumption [WDWS10]. Messages can contain mea-
surements [BMP+10, ZHM+12], individual classifications labels [ZMH09, RM08,
BMP+10, ZHM+12, MPH07], classification parameters [ZMH09, WDWS10], or repu-
tation scores [BMP+10]. In this work the content of messages is defined by the proto-
col described in Section 3. A way to limit the computational and networking require-
ments is to transmit only messages classified as outliers [ZMH09, ZHM+12, FOC+11].
Outlier classification can be performed using a variety of techniques [SNQ12]:
statistical methods classify measurements based on their underlying probability dis-
tribution, of which a model is required a priori. Clustering algorithms use machine
learning techniques to group measurements in different classes, they require the def-
inition of a distance measure. Classification algorithms detect outliers by drawing
a boundary that separates normal measurements and events, these algorithms do
not require a model of the data but require training, either supervised or unsuper-
vised. Examples of classification algorithms are Support Vector Machines, which use
a non-linear function (kernel) to map the input into a higher-dimensional space and
Bayesian Networks which generate a graph of random variables, whose connection
represent conditional probabilities. Training of these algorithms can be done online
[ZMH09, RM08, RM08] or offline during a training phase [WDWS10, BMHH09].
Clustering and classification are the most popular techniques, as they can be used
in both decentralized and distributed systems. The approach used in this work is
classification, specifically One-class SVMs [LSKM04], which produces a binary clas-
sification. Nevertheless, the mechanism described in this paper does not depend on
a specific classification algorithm. Other approaches support a n-ary classification in
the number of event types [WDWS10]. Detection might be noisy i.e. flipped with
a certain probability [FLK13]. In this work the network is assumed to be reliable,
so detection labels are always correct. Relaxing this assumption and dealing with
sensor failures is left to future work.
The performance of different algorithms is measured with the standard measures
of Precision and Recall.
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2.1. Criteria for a generally-applicable detection algorithm
A generally-applicable algorithm should run on any network organization, there-
fore measurement and detection should be separated [MPH07]. This separation
allows for assigning an arbitrary number of sensors to an agent running an event
detection algorithm, a prerequisite for supporting both a centralized a organization,
where all sensors are connected to a single agent, and a decentralized organization,
where there are as many agents as sensors. The detection algorithm used in the
paper is based on the distributed implementation of [ZMH09], as it is parsimonious
in communication and satisfies the following requirements:
• It supports networks with heterogeneous sensors. Heterogeneous networks can
be seen as a combination of homogeneous subnetworks, where every type of
sensor is processed separately. Two sensors are of different type if either they
measure different event types, or if they measure the same event type but out-
put a different signal, e.g. measure fire with smoke detectors or heat detectors.
• Each agent has its own classification algorithm which allows each sensor to
learn independently of the others, thus supporting a distributed organization.
• Measurements are not assumed to be correlated in space or time.
In order to model a distributed organization, agents are allowed to exchange their
measurements with their 1-hop neighborhood and receive their neighbors’ opinion.
The system is robust to failures as every agent is able to produce alarms even if there
are no neighbors to communicate with. Another advantage of independent classifiers
is that every agent could have one classifier for each sensor it is connected to. This
makes the system more resilient to malfunctioning sensors, making the system suit-
able for networks with cheap and unreliable hardware. Moreover each classifier can
adapt to its local conditions, for example locations with high background noise.
All these requirements ensure the general applicability of the method, moreover
the independence of this method from a specific classifier allows it to be trained
either offline or online.
3. Problem Formulation
The environment is a set of locations L. A signal xtl , the ground truth, is generated
randomly by some sensor at each location l and each time t, by sampling from some
unknown random variable Xl. A threshold function τl determines whether a signal
xtl is an event or not: it returns true if the signal is an event, false otherwise. No
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assumptions are made about this function, e.g. it can be a human supervisor. S is
the set of sensors in the environment and Ls is the set of locations measured by the
sensor s. By assumption, each location is covered by exactly one sensor. A is the
set of agents, each of which is connected to a set of sensors Sa ⊆ S. No overlap is
allowed between these sets: Sa, Sa′ ⊆ S, a 6= a′ ∈ A ⇒ Sa ∩ Sa′ = ∅. ∀s ∈ S, τ ′s
is the optimal classification function for sensor s, the value that minimizes false
positives and negatives. The function τ ′s is learned by the agent responsible for
sensor s and outputs a discrete value and confidence interval, for each of its sensors
s ∈ Sa, which means that for every location l a corresponding τ ′l is learned. Each
agent can communicate with other agents by emitting a message mtl . A message
mtl ⊆ 〈aID, l, xtl , t, eTY PE, sTY PE〉 is composed by:
• aID the agent ID.
• l the location where the event was measured (corresponds to the sensor ID).
• xtl the value of the signal as measured by the sensor at that location.
• t the timestep.
• eTY PE the type of event.
• sTY PE the type of sensor that measured the event.
Messages can be sent to ask for an opinion from other agents. As a response, agents
emit messages indicating their classification for transmitted event, which can take
values of true, false, or unknown if the event type is not valid or if the confidence
about the classification is low. Similarly agents can communicate to the supervisor,
in order to report events, by triggering alarms wtl with the same structure as normal
messages. All data that is transmitted over the network is assumed to be subject to
a transmission cost, except for data transmitted locally from sensor to agent, which
has neither communication nor privacy cost. All communication over the network
is assumed to be eavesdropped, thus it has a privacy cost if it contains sensitive
information, e.g. the sensor ID. It is assumed that the sensor ID cannot be inferred
when intercepting a message from an agent, even if that agent is connected to only
one sensor. This assumption is reasonable for systems that randomly generate agent
IDs at every transmission, e.g. mix zones [BS04].
Performance is evaluated according to the following criteria:
• Accuracy is defined as follows:
– True Positive (TP) if τl(xtl) = true and wtl has been triggered.
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– False Positive (FP) if τl(xtl) = false and wtl has been triggered.
– True Negative (TN) if τl(xtl) = false and wtl has not been triggered.
– False Negative (FN) if τl(xtl) = true and wtl has not been triggered.
– Precision: TP/(TP+FP)
– Recall: TP/(TP+FN)
– F-Measure: 2*(Precision*Recall)/(Precision+Recall)
• Communication cost: It depends on the application, e.g. proportional to band-
width used or power consumption.
• Privacy cost: It depends on the application, e.g. the quantity of privacy-
sensitive pieces of information contained in the measurement.
4. Experimental Setting
This section describes technical details about the framework and introduces the
experimental setup.
4.1. Framework
The event detection process of a network of sensors is simulated as follows:
1. A ground truth for the event is randomly generated, indicating what sensor
perceives an event and at what time.
2. A measurement is generated for each sensor, whose value is sampled, depending
on the ground truth, from one of two probability distributions, one determining
the events and the other the normal measurements.
3. Each sensor performs a measurement and reports it to the agent to which it is
connected.
4. Each agent receives one or more measurements and performs classification on
them.
5. Optionally and depending on the network organization, agents exchange mea-
surements via the network.
6. Each agent reports alarms to the supervisor.
7. The supervisor logs all alarms reported by the network and, optionally, provides
feedback about the classification that can be used to train classifiers.
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Figure 1 describes visually how the framework operates, from the point of view
of an agent.
Each agent classifies all events it receives with a One-Class SVM classifier. Each
classifier is trained on the measurements corresponding to only one specific event
type, and is used to classify only events of the same type. Alternatively agents could
train a different classifier for each sensor. The advantage of the latter solution is that
classifiers can adapt better to individual conditions, the disadvantage is that each
classifiers receives less measurements, which can slow down online learning.
Neighbors can help an agent with the classification by providing their opinion on
measurements received by the agent. Each agent combines the opinion of the neigh-
bors by majority voting, where each vote is weighted by its classification confidence.
Combining the experience of agents can increase detection accuracy but increases
the communication on the network. If the own classification confidence is high, the
opinions of the neighbors should not change the decision, in this case it is desirable
to not transmit the message, in order to reduce the communication footprint. If
the measurement is eventually classified as an event, the agent sends a signal to the
supervisor. The feedback potentially given by the supervisor can be used to train
the classifiers.
Each piece of information contained in a message is assumed to have a strictly-
positive communication cost and a non-negative privacy cost, so reducing the amount
of information transmitted reduces the costs. There can be situations where some
piece of information has a very high privacy cost, e.g. gps location, and the in-
formation it conveys can be approximated by using a combination of other pieces
of information that have a lower privacy cost, e.g. list of visible Wi-Fi networks.
In this case substituting the first piece of information for the other pieces increases
the communication cost but reduces the privacy cost. Moreover, the transmission
of some information might not be required to achieve the goal of the communica-
tion, for example the ID of the sensor reporting a measurement is not needed for
its classification. This system works under the assumption that the communication
is subsettable: it is composed by several independent pieces of information that are
meaningful even when isolated. This is the case for the protocol defined in Section
3.
A learning algorithm can be used to optimize the content of messages, by learning
the cost in terms of communication and privacy of each piece of information. As the
information required by the supervisor and by the neighbors might differ, the agents
are equipped with two separate learning algorithms that optimize independently the
two communication channels. The machine learning algorithms need training. If
training is executed online, in a phase denoted as calibration, the algorithm learns
9
Figure 1: Flowchart describing the operations of the framework.
by trying different combinations and recording the cost of communication. If some
fundamental piece of information is omitted, e.g. the event location in an alarm, the
communication fails and a high cost is reported to the learning algorithm. These
failures might also reduce the event detection accuracy.
4.2. Experimental Setup
A network organization is defined by the connections between agents and sensors.
The total cost of communication varies with the organization, each of which has
a specific communication pattern, and with parameter settings such as number of
sensors and size of the neighborhood. All experiments are run on specific network
organizations:
In a centralized system, only one agent is connected to all sensors (Figure 2a).
A = {a}, Sa = S. All sensors transmit over the network so the transmission and
privacy costs are equivalent and constant. In a decentralized system every agent is
connected to exactly one sensor (Figure 2b). Sa, Sa′ ⊆ S, a 6= a′ ⇒ Sa ∩ Sa′ = ∅.
Every agent trains an independent classifiers for its own sensor. Sensors transmit to
the agent through a dedicated channel, as they are physically connected, thus they do
not pay any cost of communication. Agents instead communicate over the network,
so they pay a cost to transmit to the supervisor. A distributed system is similar to
a decentralized system, but additionally agents can communicate with each other
over the network. At every timestep, the agent can send a message to its neighbors
and receive as an answer the output of the classification functions of the neighbors.
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(a) Centralized. (b) Fully distributed.
(c) Partially distributed.
Figure 2: Illustrations of different organizations.
The agent then produces a new classification for the event by aggregating its own
classification and the neighbor’s classification by majority vote.
Experiments are run within the framework described above in order to evaluate
the proposed mechanism. The main feature of PriMaL is the learning algorithm that
filters the information to be transmitted. Learning algorithms can be trained either
offline, with some historical data, or online, with data collected by the system in
operations. If the latter training method is chosen, the system goes trough an initial
calibration phase where the learning algorithm collects experience and might not
perform as expected. In the scenario outlined in this paper, the learning algorithm
operates on the content of communication, so during the calibration phase messages
might not contain the information they are supposed to. If this is the case, the
detection accuracy can decrease. The tradeoff between privacy and accuracy during
calibration needs to be explored, in order to confirm the validity of the method, and
this is done over several experiments.
The first experiment explores the effect of calibration on performance where
a fully distributed network (cf. Figure 2b) is equipped with uncalibrated learning
algorithms and compared to a network where the learning algorithm is disabled.
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The second experiment compares privacy and accuracy of a detection algo-
rithm for varying parameter values and network organizations. Parameters such as
the number of sensors and the size of the neighborhood have an influence on the com-
munication footprint of the algorithms (cf. Section 6), thus on its privacy footprint
and accuracy. In order to compare different simulations, the measures are taken on
a system that is already calibrated and that reached a steady state.
The choice of what to communicate is as important as the accuracy of classifi-
cation for the performance of the system. So far it has been assumed that the two
correspond: only events with a positive classification are transmitted. The third
experiment relaxes this assumption and compares the effect of different criteria on
privacy and accuracy. Classification has two characteristics: the label and the confi-
dence. A transmission criterion based on the classification label is to transmit only
measurements with positive classification. This criterion works well if classification is
confident, but it might lead to bad performance if the confidence is low. A criterion
based on the confidence is to transmit all measurements for which the confidence
is low. This criterion is suitable for improving the average classification confidence
as it can be used to ask for the opinion of neighbors in a distributed organisation.
All simulations are run with the same parameters in a fully distributed organization
(cf. Figure 2b), and are compared to a baseline with classification disabled, which
sends all messages to both the neighbors and the supervisor. Note that all combi-
nation that involve transmitting all measurements to the supervisor have the same
performance as the baseline, thus they are omitted from the comparison.
5. Results
The first experiment investigates the effect of calibration on privacy and de-
tection accuracy. Figure 3a shows that a network with learning agents (dashed line)
starts at a lower performance level than a network without learning agents (contin-
uous line), but the performance of the former grows until it reaches that of latter.
Figure 3b shows that this reduction in performance is compensated by a reduction
in privacy cost starting very early in the simulation. In other words, the learning
algorithm reduces both the performance and the privacy cost during the calibration
phase, but performance recovers quickly to a normal value. In both cases the classi-
fiers learn online, therefore accuracy improves over time and the number of messages
transmitted, thus the privacy cost, decreases e.g. false positive reports, requests to
the neighbors. Important to note that the learning algorithm of choice is standard
and not optimized, so the calibration time could be substantially reduced by a more
sophisticated algorithm.
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Figure 3: First experiment. Effect of learning calibration on classification. Shaded area corresponds
to 0.95 confidence interval.
The second experiment looks at the effect of different parameter values on pri-
vacy and accuracy. Figure 4 shows the change in communication frequency towards
the supervisor, for varying population and neighborhood size. The neighborhood
size is found not to change the communication frequency: an increase of the number
of messages exchanged by the agents does not change the number of alarms sent
to the supervisor. The population size has instead a significant influence on the
communication frequency, as each agent reports positive classifications to the super-
visor, thus the more the agents the more the reports. Note that a centralized and
a fully distributed organization (cf. Figure 2a and 2b) have a similar communica-
tion footprint. Figure 5 shows the change in communication frequency towards the
neighbors, in a distributed organization, for varying population and neighborhood
size. The plots highlight a positive dependency between communication frequency
and both parameters, which is easily explained by the increased interconnectivity
between the population: each agent communicates with its neighbors, so increasing
either the number of agents or the number of neighbors increases the number of
transmitted messages. Figure 6 shows that the privacy of a distributed organiza-
tion (solid line) is lower than the privacy of a centralized organization (dashed line)
whenever the neighborhoods are below a certain size. This result shows the tradeoff
between centralized and distributed organizations: in a centralized organization the
privacy cost is constant and comes from every sensor sending all its measurements
to the central agent. Note that all this communication is not optimized by the learn-
ing algorithm, as it can only operate on the less numerous alarms that the agent
reports, on which the learning algorithm can operate. In a distributed organization
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the messages exchanged by sensors and agents do not contribute to the privacy cost,
but so do messages exchanged between agents. A distributed organization is less
privacy-costly than a centralized organization whenever the messages transmitted
between agents are less than the number of sensors. Results show that a learning al-
gorithm makes a distributed organization more privacy-preserving than a centralized
organization, for any parameter values (cf. Figure 6). To complete the evaluation,
performance of a centralized and a fully distributed organization are compared, with
learning enabled. Figure 7 shows that a distributed organization has slightly lower
performance than a centralized organization, although the difference is not signifi-
cant. The only exception are decentralized organizations (neighborhood size equals
to zero) that have worse performance than a centralized organization.
In the third experiment three communication criteria are evaluated: a denotes
transmitting all measurements, o denotes transmitting only measurements with a
positive classification, i.e. outliers, and c denotes transmitting only measurements
whose classification is uncertain i.e. confidence of classification is lower than a thresh-
old. Different criteria can be used to transmit to the neighbors and to the supervisor,
a pair (x,y) denotes using criterion x to communicate to the neighbors and criterion
y to communicate to the supervisor. The baseline is denoted as “No class” and cor-
responds to a system which transmits all measurements. Transmitting a message
based on its classification increases the accuracy of the system and reduces the com-
munication cost when compared to a system that transmits all messages. Figure 8
shows a tradeoff between privacy and accuracy: using the confidence as criterion,
denoted with (c,o), gives the lowest privacy cost, while the combination (o,o), which
uses classification label as criterion, produces the highest performance.
6. Related Work
This section compares the communication and privacy footprint of several state-
of-the-art event detection algorithms in distributed sensor networks (cf. Table D.1).
Algorithms are implemented and evaluated within the simulation framework. The
performance obtained in the simulation are not comparable with those achieved by
the original work, as all algorithms are run with the same type of classifier (one-class
SVM), which might differ from what is used in the original work. Nevertheless com-
munication is modeled accurately, so the results can be used to compare the cost
and privacy cost across algorithms. For some algorithms the number of messages
transmitted depends on the classification accuracy, thus having the same classifier
across simulations helps reducing this variability by having a more uniform classi-
fication accuracy. These algorithms are not chosen based on their accuracy but on
14
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Neighborhood size (fraction of population)
0
5
10
15
20
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
su
pe
rv
iso
r
Centralized Distributed
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of sensors
0
5
10
15
20
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
su
pe
rv
iso
r
Centralized Distributed
Figure 4: Second experiment. Communication frequency towards the supervisor for different pa-
rameter configurations. A centralized and a distributed organization produce the same results if
classification is disabled. Shaded area corresponds to 0.95 confidence interval.
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Figure 5: Second experiment. Communication frequency towards neighbors for a distributed orga-
nization. Shaded area corresponds to 0.95 confidence interval.
their communication footprint. Given that the interest is in the communication cost,
more than in the performance of the algorithm, expanding the comparison to more
algorithms with the same communication footprint would not strengthen the results.
6.1. Communication Profiles
The algorithms can be classified based on the criteria for communication to the
supervisor and to the neighbors. An algorithm is denoted as “privacy preserving”
if the communication between neighbors does not reveal any privacy-sensitive infor-
mation that could be intercepted by the supervisor, e.g. it is omitted or obfuscated.
All simulations are repeated for different values of parameters: number of sensors,
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Figure 6: Second experiment. Comparison of privacy cost for different parameter configurations.
Privacy of a centralized system does not vary when enabling learning. Shaded area corresponds to
0.95 confidence interval.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Neighborhood size (fraction of population)
0.750
0.755
0.760
0.765
0.770
0.775
0.780
0.785
F-
M
ea
su
re
Centralized Distributed
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of sensors
0.760
0.765
0.770
0.775
0.780
0.785
0.790
F-
M
ea
su
re
Centralized Distributed
Figure 7: Second experiment. Comparison of performance for different parameter configurations.
Shaded area corresponds to 0.95 confidence interval.
probability of an event happening, and size of neighborhood (only for distributed
organizations).
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Figure 8: Third experiment. Privacy/performance trade-off of different communication functions.
Shaded area corresponds to 0.95 confidence interval.
privacy
preserving
communication
between agents
communication
to supervisor
example
True outlier outlier [ZMH09]
True outlier always
True always outlier [RM08]
True always always
False outlier outlier [ZHM+12]
False outlier always
False always outlier [MPH07, WDWS10]
False always always [BMP+10]
False N/A outlier [ZR07, FOC+11, FLK13]
False N/A always [BMHH09]
Note that the communication frequency towards the supervisor varies with the
number of agents but it does not vary with the size of the neighborhood, while the
communication frequency towards the neighbors varies with both parameters. If
agents have no neighbors, different communication methods between agents have no
effect.
6.2. Comparison
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the average number of messages exchanged across
simulations, error bars represent standard deviations. Each point represents the
value at the last iteration of a simulation. This representation has been chosen
because values do not vary significantly during the simulation, so the final value is
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representative of the whole simulation. The comparison shows that the frequency
of communication varies broadly across algorithms, this result suggests that these
algorithms were not designed with the goal of privacy minimization in mind. Finally,
the privacy cost produced by each of these algorithms is compared to the same
algorithm equipped with PriMaL. Figure 11 shows that PriMaL is able to reduce
the privacy cost of the algorithms. Notable exceptions are algorithms that do not
communicate to the neighbors and ZMH09, which does so by transmitting privacy-
neutral classification parameters instead of measurements.
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Figure 9: Communication frequency towards the neighbors. Error bars correspond to 0.95 confi-
dence interval.
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Figure 10: Communication frequency towards the supervisor. Error bars correspond to 0.95 confi-
dence interval.
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Figure 11: Effect of the learning mechanism on privacy cost. Simulation parameters: population
size 10, neighborhood size 0.2. Error bars correspond to 0.95 confidence interval.
7. Conclusions
This paper introduces PriMaL, a machine-learning based mechanism to increase
privacy in distributed sensor networks. The mechanism can be combined with exist-
ing event detection algorithms and works on any network topology or organization.
The trade-off between its performance, communication frequency and privacy cost
is quantified in a simulation framework. The performance of PriMaL is validated by
applying it on top of existing event detection algorithms and comparing their commu-
nication footprint and privacy cost. Criteria for a generally-applicable event detection
algorithm are individuated from this comparison. The privacy-accuracy trade-off of
the algorithm, equipped with PriMaL, is quantified for different parameter configu-
rations and in decentralized, distributed and centralized network organizations. An
initial calibration phase might be required to train the learning algorithms. Exper-
imental results show that calibration has a temporary negative effect on detection
performance, but this is compensated by an immediate reduction of the privacy cost.
Depending on the size of the neighborhoods, a distributed organization can have
a lower communication footprint than a centralized organization. It is found that
the threshold under which a distributed organization has a lower privacy than the
respective centralized organization is relatively low, thus in privacy-sensitive scenar-
ios a centralized organization is preferable over a distributed organization with large
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, it is found that PriMaL is able to improve privacy
of a distributed organization by optimizing the content of communication between
agents. PriMaL reduces the privacy cost of a distributed event detection algorithm
below that of a centralized algorithm, given some assumptions about the protocol,
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while the performance of detection remains comparable to that of the centralized
algorithm.
Future work should generalize the results by relaxing some assumptions, for ex-
ample introducing correlation between measurements by allowing multiple sensors
to perceive the same events. The assumption of reliability should be relaxed and the
system should be tested in the presence of failures of sensors and links. Furthermore,
the robustness the learning algorithm should be tested when adding uncalibrated
nodes to the network. The performance of the mechanism should also be investi-
gated for more complex network topologies and more complex privacy settings. For
example where each agent associates individual privacy costs to transmittable in-
formation. In this last scenario issues of cooperation, competition and negotiation
might arise and should be investigated.
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Appendix A. Experimental setup
All results presented in this paper are an average of 50 simulations, which have
been stopped after 200 iterations, enough to approach a steady state.
Performance of the system has been measured for the following parameters values:
• number of sensors: 10 and 50
• size of neighborhood: 0%, 20% and 50% of the population size.
• frequency of events:
– probability of an event happening at every sensor/timestep: 0.2 and 0.5
– total number of events happening during the simulation: 300 and 600
Results show that the effect of the frequency of events is straightforward: the
more frequent the events, the higher the communication and the higher the precision
of the classification.
All graphs compare simulations with the same parameter configuration.
The framework is implemented in Python, it is composed by the following entities:
Appendix A.1. Sensors
A sensor reads and transmits measurements. Each sensor has a type, identifying
the events it can measure.
At each timestep a sensor measures the environment. The measurement is sam-
pled from one of two random variables, one for normal and one for abnormal mea-
surements. Depending on the desired type of measurement, one or the other function
is used.
Each sensor contains a list of agents that are subscribed to it, to whom it it
transmits every measurement.
Appendix A.2. Network
Sensors and agents transmit their messages through the network. The task of the
network is to compute the costs of each transmission, which depend on the message
sent and on the distance between source and destination. The network contains a
topology matrix that identifies the distance between each sensor and agent. The
distance is binary: either 0 (pair is physically connected) or 1 (pair is connected
through the network). This topology determines the cost of transmission between
two entities.
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Appendix A.3. Remote
This object represents the supervisor. Its task is to provide the ground truth
about events, record the alarms and compute the system accuracy.
Appendix A.4. Transmitter
Transmitter uses Q-Learning to learn what information to transmit. Each agent
holds two instances of transmitter: one for transmissions to other agents, the other
for transmissions to the supervisor. Transmitter receives as feedback the costs com-
puted by the network, and learns what information is good to transmit and what
information can be skipped.
Appendix A.5. Classifier
It encapsulates a classification algorithm (SVM) and is used by an agent to classify
its measurements. Each agent trains a classifier with the local measurements and
uses its classification to decide when to send alarms. The classifier provides the
classification confidence as well, depending on which an agent might communicate
with its neighbor to ask for their opinion on the event. It can work is an unsupervised
or in a supervised way, depending on whether the feedback is provided.
Appendix A.6. Agent
The main entity of the simulation. The agent receives and processes measure-
ments from a number of sensors. Each agent contains a classifier for each sensor type
it is subscribed to. Each classifier is trained on the measurements reported by all sen-
sors of that type that the agent is subscribed to. Agents contain a list of neighbors to
which they can communicate. Communication consists in sending a measurement to
the neighbors and receiving their classification for that value, which are then aggre-
gated into a single classification label. Communication with the neighbors and with
the supervisor is performed whenever some conditions are met, by default whenever
the measurement is classified as event.
Agents are equipped with a single classifier for each sensor type, which is trained
in a supervised way on the ground truth provided by the supervisor. Each agent
contains two transmitters, one for communications to the neighbors, the other for
communications to the supervisor. The transmitters learn independently what pieces
of information to transmit and what to suppress.
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Appendix A.7. Classification
Classification is implemented using the One-class SVM class in the SKlearn li-
brary. One-Class SVM has been chosen because it is the state of the art classifi-
cation, and they can be used both in supervised and unsupervised mode, giving us
implementation flexibility. This choice does not influence the applicability of the
mechanism.
Unless events are extremely rare, SVMs cannot be successfully trained online
without supervision: the first measurements that the classifier receives have a strong
influence on the classification, so if an event is measured in the early timesteps
the classification accuracy might be compromised. A few labeled elements (normal
measurements) are enough to initialize the classifier correctly.
Training should be done including only one class of elements, either normals or
outliers. An SVM is able to learn online and tolerate some false measurements,
assuming the initialization was correct. The classifier is trained with normal points.
Appendix A.8. Learning
In the experiments the cost function is arbitrary, where only one piece of infor-
mation has a privacy cost. This is realistic for the scenario of earthquake detection
with smartphones, where only the location is privacy-sensitive. All other pieces of
information have a unitary transmission cost.
The choice of cost function influences the costs and learning, but it does not
influence the applicability of the mechanism.
The learning algorithm is trained using a combination of a fixed transmission cost
and a variable privacy cost that can differ based on the content of the messages.
Q-Learning has been chosen because it is a online supervised learning algorithm
that is computationally very fast for small spaces. Moreover the algorithm has not
been optimized, to prove the point that even a simple and not efficient solution can
bring a benefit to the system, which can become even greater for more sophisti-
cated learning algorithms. This choice does not influence the applicability of the
mechanism.
Appendix A.9. implementation assumptions
• classification is binary, as in [FLK13, FOC+11, ZMH09, RM08], this assump-
tion is not a necessary precondition for this mechanism to operate.
• In the distributed setting agents are computing the overall classification of the
neighborhood using majority vote, similarly to [RM08, BZMH09, BMP+10].
This aggregation function has been chosen arbitrarily, but any other function
will work with the mechanism.
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• Each sensor has its own classifier, as in [FOC+11, ZMH09, RM08, BMP+10].
Other approaches keep a system-level threshold [FLK13, BMHH09], which is
not suitable in this setting as it reduces the flexibility of the system.
– Classification is implemented with One-Class SVM classifiers [LSKM04,
ZMH09] with a sliding window, as they are robust and able to operate
both in a supervised and unsupervised way. The choice of classifier is
arbitrary.
– The classifier is trained on the normal data and detects events as outliers,
as in [FOC+11].
– If a sensor is connected to more than one agent, each agent keeps a sepa-
rate classifier.
Appendix B. Methodological Requirements
An algorithm must have the following properties in order to be generally appli-
cable, i.e. work in every network organization:
• Sensors specifications (inputs and outputs) cannot be modified.
• Sensors have no intelligence
• Each agent can be associated with one or more sensors, this allows the method
to be independent of the network organization
• Have independent classifiers in each agent
• Work without offline training
• Agents are allowed to communicate with neighbors, for example if classification
confidence is low.
Appendix C. Assumptions
For simplicity of implementation, the following is assumed:
• Events are independent. With this assumption heterogeneous networks can be
decomposed in independent networks for each type of event and sensor type,
which can be analyzed individually.
– Time correlation is not considered, but it is neither excluded.
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– There is no correlation between signals of different sensor types, e.g. fire
cannot be detected by both temperature and smoke sensors.
– One sensor type cannot detect more than one measurement type, e.g.
temperature sensors cannot detect both fire and intrusion, this can be
modeled by one virtual sensor type for each event type.
• Each sensor is connected to only an agent. A sensor connected to multiple
agents can be modeled as several virtual sensors with the same readings.
– The sensors are perfectly reliable and always communicate the truth.
• Agents can communicate with others and ask for their opinion.
– The network is perfectly reliable: transmissions are always successful.
– Agents do not forward messages from other agents, this avoids loops and
cascade effects.
• Everything that is transmitted over the network is subject to a (privacy and
communication) cost.
• The location of a measurement cannot be inferred by knowing what an agent
transmits, even if that agent is connected only to only one sensor. This assump-
tion is reasonable if agents randomly change their ID at every transmission e.g.
in mix-nets.
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Appendix D. Detailed review of event detection algorithms
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[FOC+11] develop a system for detecting events
from smartphones, which imposes some extra
constraints on communication and robustness to
noise. Their default system is decentralized, but
not distributed: agents do not exchange any
information with their neighbors. Nevertheless
they introduce a way of making the algorithm
distributed by having the network compute the
detection in a bottom-up way, by propagating
the signal up the hierarchy. This works well if
there is locality because the nodes close in the
hierarchy will also be close in the environment, if
locality is absent the communication overhead is
more intensive. Each sensor has its own classifier,
trained on the local observations and triggers bi-
nary alarms anytime a measurement is classified
as event. The accuracy of their method is based
on the assumption that event are very rare, so
each sensor is able to identify events based purely
on its own local observations without requiring
any supervision.
[FLK13] looks at event detection in noisy sen-
sor networks, specifically at earthquake detec-
tion. Their sensors generate noisy binary mea-
surements: classification of measurements (as
event or non-event) is flipped with some con-
stant probability. They introduce a centralized
fusion center to aggregate individual measure-
ments. The fusion center learns a global thresh-
old which is applied to all sensors, therefore indi-
vidual sensors cannot adapt the threshold to the
local setting.
1although every sensor measures the same event
2if using hierarchical anomaly detection
3unless using in-network aggregation
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They also introduce a hierarchical aggregation mechanism which reduces the com-
munication footprint by computing the statistics in a bottom-up way. This mecha-
nism can be applied only if the learned basis exhibits a hierarchical structure. The
amount of information transmitted to the fusion center varies based on the system
configuration: with the default setting all sensors send all their measurements to the
fusion center, while when implementing “hierarchical anomaly detection”, only what
is classified as event by the local classification algorithm is transmitted.
[ZMH09] develop a distributed system where each sensor is equipped with a One-
class SVM classifier that is trained online on the local observations. They assume
each sensor is equipped with a classifier. By not separating the roles of sensors and
agents, they effectively limit the flexibility of the organization as the system cannot
assume any configuration in which an agent supervises more than one sensor, e.g.
centralized, hierarchical. They assume that measurements are spatially correlated,
therefore neighbors have similar classifications. In this case spatial correlation is a
feature of the environment, i.e. sensors that are geographically close together measure
similar events, but the same situation could be obtained with an appropriate network
topology, i.e. sensors that are topologically close measure similar events. Sensors
exploit the correlation in the data by exchanging parameters with their neighbors,
which they use to classify the events they measure. Sensors broadcast their updated
parameter anytime they detect an outlier, each agent aggregates the parameters
sent by the neighbors and use them to confirm their classifications. Moreover in
this approach classifiers are isolated, in the sense that the parameters exchanged by
the neighbors are used after the classification as a further check. With this system
calibration is not possible: a classifier with a bad accuracy will not be able to improve
by learning from the neighbors.
[ZHM+12] uses statistical models, which are trained offline, to detect outliers.
Subsequent sensor readings are collected in time series and outliers are defined as
a sequence of observations that fall outside the predicted confidence interval. With
respect to the other solutions, the definition of outlier changes from defining a single
anomalous observation to defining a sequence of observations. Every agent asks con-
firmation to the neighbors whenever it detects an outlier, and uses this information
to verify its classification.
[RM08] look at the consensus problem in agreeing on a global classification label.
This system differs from others as agents have to take not one but several decisions,
considering the opinion of the neighbors, until the majority of agents agrees on an
answer. This system is very demanding in terms of transmission cost, as each sensor
communicates its classification to the whole population (fully connected graph) at
every iteration, until (and if) consensus is reached. An assumption behind this system
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is that all sensor perceive the same events and collectively classify them, while other
distributed systems only require that some other agent perceives events of the same
type.
[BMHH09] also look at the consensus problem. The difference with the previous
approach is the presence of a fusion center, which collects classifications from agents
and computes consensus. It assumes the event (fire) has a known signature that
can be learned offline, so the system effectively does not need to adapt to changes.
Sensors send their measurements to sensor nodes, what we call agents, which compute
classification and report only the outliers to the fusion center. The fusion center
distinguishes between outliers occurring at individual nodes and events that are
detected by many nodes, this is based on the assumption that events are spatially
and temporally correlated, so an event can be detected by more than one node.
Agents classify independently and do not communicate with each other, so this is a
typical example of hierarchical configuration.
[BMP+10] is an extension of the previous work with the inclusion of a reputation
mechanism. Each sensor type has a decision tree that is used to classify the events,
this algorithm needs to be trained offline and the training set is the same over many
sensors. Such requirement does not allow sensors to specialize to their individual en-
vironmental conditions, for example background noise. The reputation system, built
on the evaluations given by agents to each other, is useful to detect and neutralize
broken sensors, but has the disadvantage of increasing the communication overhead:
the supervisor requires every agent to transmit the reputation scores they assign to
every other neighbor, this sums up to the communication between neighbors. Despite
neighbors communicate with each other their measurements, the system is decentral-
ized as this communication is only used to build the reputation scores and not to
improve classification. Moreover there is a central aggregator which computes the
global consensus.
[WDWS10] develop a distributed approach where nodes improve their classifica-
tion with “feature vectors”, i.e. a compressed version of the measurement, sent by
the neighbors. Communication overhead is kept low by reporting only events that
are detected, although neighbors communicate at every timestep. This approach
requires an offline training phase where a centralized feature selection algorithm is
used to simplify and summarize the measurements coming from the sensors. This,
and logging the reported events, are the only tasks the central entity performs. At
the individual level, every agent has its own classifier so it is able to adapt to local
differences. An assumption is that events propagate evenly to all neighbors.
[ZR07] perform event detection with multiple sensors. They convert measure-
ments using the Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (SAX) algorithm, and perform
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pattern matching on the symbols. Their algorithm features an offline learning phase
where a signature of the event is built by performing feature selection. Sensors
classify in isolation, so their approach is decentralized but not distributed.
[MPH07] develop a distributed fuzzy engine for event detection. Fuzzy logic is
able to process multi-sensor data, so individual data is combined to that of the neigh-
bors in order to improve the classification accuracy. A disadvantage of this system
is that it is very communication intensive, as neighbors broadcast their measure-
ments at every timestep. In this approach reasoning is decoupled from the sensors,
so in principle an agent can serve any number of sensors, which makes this algorithm
adaptable to different network organizations.
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